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BANKING LAW-BRANCH BANKS-ARKANSAS BRANCH BANKING
LAWS ARE PREEMPTED BY THE EMERGENCY ACQUISITION PROVISION
OF FIRREA. Arkansas State Bank Commissioner v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
On February 13, 1990, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
held an instructional bid meeting.' At this meeting the RTC informed
prospective bidders about the sale of two failed Arkansas thrift institu-
tions.2 An RTC representative conveyed that the RTC's interpretation
of 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k),' a provision within the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),4 author-
ized the RTC to override Arkansas branch banking restrictions with
regard to a bank acquiring a failed or failing thrift and operating its
offices as bank branches.5
1. Arkansas State Bank Comm'r v. Resolution Trust Corp., 911 F.2d 161, 162 (8th Cir.
1990). The RTC is a newly created governmental agency entrusted with the duty of disposing of
failed or failing thrifts and managing these thrifts in the interim before sale. 12 U.S.C.A. §
144Ia(b) (West 1989).
2. Arkansas State Bank Comm'r v. Resolution Trust Corp., 745 F. Supp. 550, 551 (E.D.
Ark.), rev'd, 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
3. The emergency thrift acquisition provision of FIRREA originated in section 408(K) of
the National Housing Act and has been transferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as
section 13(K). For the wording of the provision, see infra text accompanying note 84. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1823(k) (West 1989). The branching subsection provides:
If a merger, consolidation, transfer, or acquisition under this subsection involves a sav-
ings association eligible for assistance and a bank or bank holding company, a savings
association may retain and operate any existing branch or branches or any other ex-
isting facilities. If the savings association continues to exist as a separate entity, it may
establish and operate new branches to the same extent as any savings association that is
not affiliated with a bank holding company and the home office of which is located in
the same State.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (West 1989).
4. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West 1989)).
5. 911 F.2d at 162. Arkansas state branching restrictions will gradually be phased out until
December 31, 1998, when statewide branching is permitted. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-1202
(Supp. 1989). The section provides:
(b) (1) A bank may establish full service branches and customer-bank communication
terminals anywhere within the county in which the establishing bank's princi-
pal banking office is located;
(2) A bank which relocates its principal banking office may continue to use its
former principal banking office location as a full service branch and customer-
bank communication terminal so long as the use as a banking facility is
uninterrupted;
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Following this initial meeting, on February 15, 1990, the RTC no-
tified the Arkansas State Bank Commissioner (Commissioner) 6 of its
intent to file a declaratory action that would allow it to sell the two
thrift institutions to state7 or nationally8 chartered banks in Arkansas."
However, on February 21, 1990, the RTC instead advised the Commis-
sioner that another bid meeting would be held on February 27, 19 90.1°
On February 23, 1990, after being advised of the RTC action, the
Commissioner filed an action in federal district court requesting a pre-
liminary injunction to enjoin the threatened preemption of Arkansas
branch banking law." The Commissioner also filed a motion for emer-
gency declaratory relief and for a temporary restraining order. 2 The
motion for a temporary restraining order was dismissed without
prejudice, but the court allowed the Commissioner the right to renew
the claim.13 After the initial ruling, the RTC assured the court that if
it received any bids conditioned upon the preemption of Arkansas
branch banking law, it would notify the Commissioner within forty-
(3) In addition to the above subdivisions, after December 31, 1993, a bank may
locate one (1) or more full service branches and customer-bank communication
terminals anywhere within any counties contiguous to the county in which its
principal banking office is located;
(4) After December 31, 1998, a bank may locate one (1) or more full service
branches and customer-bank communication terminals anywhere in this state.
Id. Arkansas branching restrictions also apply to nationally chartered banks located in the state
pursuant to federal law which provides:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, establish and operate new branches: (i) Within the limits of the city, town, or
village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at
the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and
(2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establish-
ment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the
State in question. ...
12 U.S.C. § 36(c)(1988).
6. The Bank Commissioner is appointed by the Governor, subject to Senate approval, and
is charged with the execution of Arkansas banking laws. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-31-204 to -205
(1987).
7. The State Banking Board has the responsibility of ruling upon an application for a state
bank charter after such application has been filed with the Bank Commissioner. If the Board
approves the application, the Commissioner, if he also approves, may issue the charter. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 23-31-305 (1987).
8. With regard to national bank charters, the Comptroller of the Currency has the respon-
sibility of ruling upon the applications for such charters. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1814 (West 1989).
9. 745 F. Supp. at 552.
10. Id.
11. 911 F.2d at 162.
12. Id.
13. 745 F. Supp. at 552.
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eight business hours."' Relying on this assurance, the Commissioner
withdrew the request for a preliminary injunction."5 At that time, the
Arkansas Independent Bankers Association (Independent Bankers)
successfully intervened, and the RTC cancelled its scheduled February
27th meeting."
On April 19, 1990, the RTC published notice in the Federal Reg-
ister of a proposed rule that would authorize a state or nationally
chartered bank to acquire and convert failed or failing thrift offices into
bank branches.' The proposed rule was adopted by the RTC Board of
Directors and became effective as of June 1, 1990.18
The RTC held another bid meeting on June 8, 1990, to inform
prospective bidders about the sale of failed or failing thrift institu-
tions.19 One of the thrift institutions in question was Independence Fed-
eral Bank, F.S.B. (Independence).2 0
Twenty bids were submitted for Independence and its branches,
but only the bid of Worthen Bank & Trust Company, N.A. (Worthen)
included the entity as a whole.2 The Worthen bid contained a
$1,500,001 premium for acquiring Independence and all of its twenty
branch offices." However, it was expressly conditioned upon a preemp-
tion of Arkansas branch banking law.' In accordance with the district
court's order, the RTC notified the Commissioner on June 26, 1990, of
its intent to preempt Arkansas branch banking law and to allow




17. 911 F.2d at 163. The regulation provides:
(a)(2) The regulations of this section provide for the retention and operation by acquir-
ing banks of the offices of savings associations acquired pursuant to Section 13(k).
(b) Each existing office or other existing facility of each savings association that is
merged or consolidated with, or the assets and liabilities of which are transferred to an
insured bank pursuant to Section 13(k) may be retained by the insured bank and oper-
ated by the bank as a branch or other facility.
55 Fed. Reg. 22,323 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1611.1).
18. 911 F.2d at 163.
19. 745 F. Supp. at 552.
20. Id. Independence operated twenty branch facilities located throughout fifteen Arkansas
counties. 911 F.2d at 163.
21. 911 F.2d at 163. Worthen Bank & Trust Company, N.A. is a nationally chartered bank
with its principal office in Little Rock, Arkansas. As of June 30, 1990, it had total assets of
$619,481,000. Worthen is held by Worthen Banking Corporation which is a multi-bank bank
holding company. REPORT OF THE BANK COMMISSIONER OF ARKANSAS (1990).
22. 911 F.2d at 163.




Upon receiving this notification, all parties involved filed successive
motions. First, the Commissioner and Independent Bankers each filed
motions for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunc-
tion. 25 Worthen moved to intervene, filed a response to the Commis-
sioner's and Independent Bankers' motions, and requested declaratory
relief.26 The RTC, as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC)27 and the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller), 8
filed motions to dismiss the complaints of the Commissioner and Inde-
pendent Bankers.29
The district court concluded that the RTC regulation that would
allow the preemption of state law was null and void and granted the
Commissioner's and Independent Bankers' motions for preliminary in-
junction.3" The court commented that 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4) 31
states nothing about the operation of thrift branches as bank branches,
but merely authorizes the acquisition of failed or failing thrifts by an
acquiring bank or bank holding company.32 Although the court recog-
nized the broad authority of federal agencies, it stated that "in this
case [the] RTC, in issuing its Override Rule, clearly overstepped its
authority pursuant to the language of the statute under which it was
acting. . . . [T]he RTC, cannot by regulation amend FIRREA to add
provisions that are not there .... 33
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed the district court's ruling. 4 The court held the RTC interpreta-
tion of 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4) permissible, and thus provided the
statutory authority to promulgate the overriding regulation.3 5 The court
also determined that the McFadden Act, which is the principal source
24. 745 F. Supp. at 552.
25. 911 F.2d at 164.
26. 745 F. Supp. at 552.
27. The FDIC was established by Congress in 1933. Under FIRREA, it oversees the opera-
tions of the RTC and is charged with the responsibility of federally insuring qualified depository
institutions. Each individual depositor is presently insured up to $100,000. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811-
1831 (West 1989).
28. See supra note 8.
29. 911 F.2d at 164.
30. Id.
31. See supra note 3.
32. 911 F.2d at 164.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 175.
35. Id. at 172.
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of authorization for national bank branching, did not limit the statute
under which the regulation was issued.36 Arkansas State Bank Com-
missioner v. Resolution Trust Corp., 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
The controversial nature of the ability of a commercial bank to
expand its deposit base through the concept of branch banking arose
relatively recently in the history of the American banking system.
37
Throughout the nineteenth century, the propriety of branch banking
was not a prominent issue.38 America possessed a rural and localized
economy, and geographic expansion of the small number of existing
banks was limited.3 9 As a result, unit banking predominated as the al-
most exclusive form of bank organization."0
At the beginning of the twentieth century, with the nation entering
the modern era of industrialization and with a more mobile and in-
creasingly affluent populace, branch banking became more important."1
Many leaders in government and the business community advocated a
bill that would provide needed banking services to rural towns.' This
developing environment provided a rich opportunity for bank expansion
by means of branching, but this movement was thwarted with the pas-
sage of the Gold Standard Act of 1900."' In the Act Congress reduced
capital requirements for nationally chartered banks in rural communi-
ties."' As a result, hundreds of new banks were created which, in effect,
"undermined the movement for branch banking before it could gain
momentum."' 6
The years following the passage of the Gold Standard Act exem-
plified the growing tension between nationally chartered and state
36. Id. at 174. The McFadden Act provides that nationally chartered bank branches may
be located within the state where the bank's principal office is located to the same extent that state
chartered banks are authorized to locate branches. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988).
37. E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 97 (2d ed. 1984).
38. Id.
39. A. POLLARD. J. PASSAIC, JR., K. ELLIS & J. DALY. BANKING LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 106 (1988).
40. Id. Unit banking involves the operation of one bank, possibly with branches, but all in
the same locality. Id.
41. Glidden, Legal Constraints on Bank Expansion: Can They Be Removed Without De-
stroying the Dual Banking System? 1980 LAW F. 369, 376 (1980).
42. Id.
43. Id. See Act of March 14, 1900, ch. 41, 31 Stat. 45 (1900).
44. Glidden, supra note 41, at 376. The Act contained a provision which reduced the capital
requirements for a nationally chartered bank to $25,000 if the bank was established in a commu-
nity with a population of 3000 or less. Glidden, supra note 41, at 376.
45. Glidden, supra note 41, at 376.
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chartered banks.48 Many state legislatures authorized state chartered
banks to pursue some form of branching, while nationally chartered
banks were confined to the restrictive concept of unit banking. 47 The
practical result of this marked advantage in favor of state chartered
banks was the conversion of national banks to state banks and the rapid
departure of banks from the newly created Federal Reserve System.48
This mounting tension came to a head in 1924 when the United
States Supreme Court decided First National Bank v. Missouri.49 The
Court considered whether a nationally chartered bank has an implied
power to establish branches pursuant to the general powers language of
the National Bank Act.5" The Court determined that the language of
the Act vests national banking associations with "all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."51
The Court inferred from various provisions of the Act that a bank has
but one place of business and does not have the authority to establish
branches.52 This decision left nationally chartered banks at a competi-
tive disadvantage, faced with the prospect of being overshadowed by
their state counterparts. 3
The congressional response to this perplexing problem was the Mc-
Fadden Act of 1927.1' The Act permitted national and state banks that
were members of the Federal Reserve System to open branch offices
but only within the cities in which their principal offices were main-
tained and only when this did not run afoul of state law. 55 A common
46. Comment, Circumventing the McFadden Act: The Comptroller of the Currency's Ef-
forts to Broaden the Branching Capabilities of National Banks, 72 Ky. L.J. 707, 713 (1984).
47. Id. at 712. The Comptroller argued in his 1923 annual report that if state banks con-
tinue to practice unlimited branch banking, it would mean the eventual destruction of the national
banking system. See H.R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1924).
48. Glidden, supra note 41, at 377. National banks are required by law to be members of
the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). However, state banks may elect not to be
members. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988).
49. 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
50. Id. at 656. The National Currency Act, as amended by the National Bank Act in 1864,
created a national currency and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency within the Treasury
Department. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864). The Act also created a national banking system primar-
ily designed to finance operations of the Union Army in the American Civil War. See Comment,
Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under the National
Bank Act. Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank Holding Company Act, 36 Sw. L.J. 765, 767-68 (1982).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
52. 263 U.S. at 659.
53. Comment, supra note 46, at 712.
54. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378. See supra note 5.
55. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378.
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misconception surrounding the passage of the Act is that it was the
origin of the doctrine of competitive equality.5 6 Most state banks were
not members of the Federal Reserve System and thus were not affected
by the limitations imposed by the Act.57 This allowed some state
chatered banks to maintain a competitive edge because they could take
advantage of less restrictive state branching laws.58
A few years later, federal branching law was made even more de-
finitive with the passage of the Banking Act of 1933, more commonly
referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act.59 The Act allows nationally
chartered banks to establish branches to the same extent as their state
counterparts, limited only by applicable state law.60 With this amend-
ment to the McFadden Act, Congress took a positive step in establish-
ing an equal basis upon which both national and state banks could
compete. 61
As amended in 1933, the McFadden Act has remained substan-
tially intact and is considered the primary source of authority for fed-
eral bank branching.62 However, in the early 1960s many attempts
were made to circumvent the Act, primarily by the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency. 3 In recent years, the Comptroller has asserted
56. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378. The doctrine of competitive equality envisions a dual
banking system that puts national and state banks on an equal footing when competing in a bank-
ing market. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378.
57. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378. The Act provided that a state could prohibit branching
altogether. However, a state did not have the power to authorize state chartered banks that were
members of the Federal Reserve System to branch beyond the city where their principal offices
were located. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378.
58. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378.
59. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378. The Glass-Steagall Act included various provisions
designed to separate investment and commercial banking and was passed to restore public confi-
dence in the soundness of commercial banks by preventing banks from dealing in securities. Act of
June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
60. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378. See supra note 5.
61. Glidden, supra note 41, at 378.
62. Comment, supra note 46, at 714. The bank holding company movement was an effective
development in the circumvention of state branching law and interstate branching law. Glidden,
supra note 41, at 380. The Bank Holding Company Act relieved pressure for adoption of inter-
state branching authority and this form of organization is still a useful tool to bypass intrastate
restrictions. Glidden, supra note 41, at 380.
63. Comment, supra note 46, at 714-15. On November 16, 1961, Comptroller Saxon took
office and publicly declared a policy directly in conflict with the McFadden Act. Comment, supra
note 46, at 714-15. In 1966 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of competitive equality
and overruled the Comptroller's attempt to certify a national bank branch in violation of state and
therefore federal law. First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252
(1966). In 1969 the Comptroller authorized nationally chartered banks to use armored car mes-
senger services. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969). Under Florida
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a position affording national or state member banks the authority to
create branches regardless of applicable state law. "'
Arkansas defined its branching policy in 1973 when the Arkansas
Legislature enacted Act 228, authorizing the establishment of branch
banks in the county in which a bank's main office is located.66 The Act
provided that a city or town in which the branch was to be established
must have a population of 250 and must not already have a legally
chartered bank existing in the city or town.6" The Act provides some
insight into the prevailing attitude toward bank branching in Arkansas
at the time. It contains a statement of intended policy favoring applica-
tions for a new banking facility in the same city or town over applica-
tions for the establishment of a branch.
67
A decade later, the legislature amended the Act to provide that
any bank may also establish a full service branch in any unincorpo-
rated area within six miles of the city limits where the bank's principal
office is located.68 A 1985 amendment allows branching outside the
county in which the bank's principal office is located if the building to
be utilized was previously used as a bank facility and had been closed
by the State Bank Commissioner or the Comptroller of the Currency. 9
In 1987 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Department of
Banking & Consumer Finance v. Clarke,70 more popularly known as
the Deposit Guaranty decision.7 1 The court held that if state chartered
thrifts are "engaged in the banking business" they would be considered
state banks within the meaning of the McFadden Act.72 This decision
allowed national banks to branch to the extent of "more liberal thrift
law, which provided for unit banking, this use of armored cars was not permitted. The Supreme
Court struck down the Comptroller's attempt to technically finesse his way around the McFadden
Act and reasserted the doctrine of competitive equality. Id. See Note, Interstate Banking Restric-
tions under the McFadden Act, 72 VA. L. REV. 1119, 1128 (1986).
64. Comment, supra note 46, at 714.
65. 1973 Ark. Acts 755, § 2 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-1202 (Supp.
1989)).
66. Id.
67. 1973 Ark. Acts 757, § 5 (codified as amended at ARK.-CODE ANN. § 23-32-1205
(1987)).
68. 1983 Ark. Acts 357, § I (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-1202 (Supp.
1989)).
69. 1985 Ark. Acts 191, § I (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-1202 (Supp.
1989)).
70. 809 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
71. Pitts, Interstate Banking and State Wide Branching in Arkansas: Act 12 of the 76th
Arkansas General Assembly, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 457, 459 (1988-89).
72. 809 F.2d at 271. See supra note 5.
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branching statutes" which usually allowed statewide branching.73
Many smaller community banks were concerned that national
banks would be allowed to circumvent the Arkansas branch banking
restrictions by relying upon the Deposit Guaranty decision. 7 In re-
sponse to this concern, the Arkansas Legislature met in special session
and implemented a gradual removal of all intrastate branch restrictions
by enacting a provision immediately establishing unlimited county-wide
branching.75 Branching in any county contiguous to the county where
the bank's principal office is located is authorized after December 31,
1993, and statewide branching is authorized after December 31,
1998.76
In Arkansas State Bank Commissioner v. Resolution Trust
Corp." the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether the Emergency Acquisitions provision of FIRREA provides
authority for the RTC to issue a regulation overriding Arkansas state
bank branching law and allowing a nationally or state chartered bank
to acquire a failed or failing thrift and convert the thrift's offices into
bank branches.7 8 The court concluded that the RTC's interpretation of
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4) rests on a premissible construction of the
statute79 and that Congress granted broad rulemaking authority to the
RTC to carry out its duties. 80 Relying upon these two conclusions, the
court upheld the regulation and ruled that FIRREA can serve as a
source of federal branching authority as an alternative to the McFad-
den Act.81
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council.82 In Chevron the United States
73. Pitts, supra note 71, at 459 n.15.
74. Pitts, supra note 71, at 457.
75. Pitts, supra note 71, at 457. See 1988 Ark. Acts 12 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-
32-1202(b)(1) (Supp. 1989)).
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-1202(b)(3)-(4) (Supp. 1989).
77. 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990) (Judge Gibson wrote the opinion for the majority).
78. Id. at 162.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 168. The duties of the RTC are statutorily defined as requiring the corporation to
proceed in a manner that "maximizes the net present value return from the sale or other disposi-
tion of institutions;.., minimizes the impact of such transactions on local real estate and financial
markets; [and] . . .minimizes the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of cases .... 12
U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(3)(C) (West 1989).
81. 911 F.2d at 174.
82. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Luneburg, Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Introduction, 2 ADMIN. L. J. 243 (1988).
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Supreme Court concluded that when a court reviews a federal agency's
interpretation of a federal statute administered by the agency, two con-
siderations must be addressed: 1) whether the congressional intent of
the statute in question is clear and unambiguous; and, if not, 2)
whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is grounded upon a
permissible construction.8" The statute in question, 12 U.S.C.A. §
1823(k)(4)(A), provides:
If a merger, consolidation, transfer, or acquisition under this subsec-
tion involves a savings association eligible for assistance and a bank or
bank holding company, a savings association may retain and operate
any existing branch or branches or any other existing facilities. If the
savings association continues to exist as a separate entity, it may es-
tablish and operate new branches to the same extent as any savings
association that is not affiliated with a bank holding company and the
home office of which is located in the same State. 4
The narrow issue of statutory interpretation concerned the mean-
ing of the second use of the words "savings association." 85 The Inde-
pendent Bankers argued that the statute is clear and unambiguous, and
that the words "savings association" mean just that-a savings associa-
tion."6 According to the Independent Bankers, a bank or bank holding
company does have the authority to acquire a savings association eligi-
ble for assistance, but does not have the authority to convert the ac-
quired facilities into bank branches. 87 The Independent Bankers also
argued that the statute only provides a savings association authority to
retain and operate the offices of the sold thrift.
88
The RTC contended that "savings association" means a pretran-
saction entity which refers to a thrift as it exists prior to merger, con-
solidation, transfer, or acquisition with or by an acquiring bank.89 If
not, RTC argued, the merger language preceding it in the statute
would be meaningless.90 The court concluded that Congress had not
directly addressed the precise issue at hand and that the words "savings
association" were capable of dual interpretation. Therefore, the first
83. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
84. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (West 1989).
85. 911 F.2d at 170.
86. Id. at 171.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 170.
90. Id. at 171.
91. Id. at 172. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. See also Independent Community
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prong of the Chevron test was satisfied.92
The court then turned to the issue of whether the RTC's interpre-
tation of the statute was grounded upon a permissible construction. 3
The RTC argued that it was given broad rulemaking authority by Con-
gress.94 It further maintained that this authority, combined with the
express override language of subsection 1823(k)(1) which grants to the
RTC the power to authorize acquisitions, "notwithstanding any provi-
sions of State law" supports the view that its interpretation of the stat-
ute is permissible. 95 In opposition to this position, the Independent
Bankers argued that the clause, "notwithstanding any provision of
State law," is applicable to paragraph (k)(1), which authorizes the ac-
quisition of a failed or failing thrift, but is not applicable to paragraph
(k)(4), which is the branching provision. 96
The court relied upon the standard established in Mourning v.
Family Publications Service, Inc.97 in which the Supreme Court held
that "the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sus-
tained so long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation."98 Applying this standard, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that when considering the broad grant of authority given to the RTC,
coupled with the introductory language of the subsection, the RTC
could have permissibly read subsection 1823(k) as providing the needed
legislative authority to issue the overriding regulation.99
The court noted that federal preemption is the underlying issue
that must be affirmatively satisfied to uphold the validity of the RTC
override authority.100 The Supreme Court dealt with this question de-
Bankers of N.M. v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 1990 WL 119633 (No. CIV. 90-532 SC D.N.M.
June 15, 1990) (court concluded that the second usage of the word "savings association" was
ambiguous at best and held that the RTC reached a permissible construction of the statute);
Colorado v. Resolution Trust Corp., 1990 WL 51191 (CIV. A. No. 90-Z-190 D. Colo. Feb. 14,
1990) (court stated that 12 U.S.C.A. §*1823 (k)(4)(A) is unambiguous and provides that a sav-
ings association, not a bank, may retain and operate any existing branch or branches or any other
existing facilities). But see Colorado v. Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991)
(court consolidated the Colorado and New Mexico federal district court cases, applied the Chev-
ron test, and upheld the RTC regulation).
92. 911 F.2d at 171.
93. Id. at 166.
94. Id. at 168.
95. Id. at 169.
96. Id.
97. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
98. Id. at 369.
99. 911 F.2d at 171.
100. Id. at 173.
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finitively in City of New York v. FCC,101 holding, "[t]he statutorily
authorized regulations of an agency will preempt any state or local law
that conflicts with such regulation or frustrates the purposes
thereof.""0 2 Pursuant to this standard, the Eighth Circuit determined
that because the RTC was operating within the sphere of its statutory
authority, it may override state law that either conflicts with or frus-
trates the duties delegated to the RTC. 03
In conclusion, the court considered whether the RTC regulation
directly conflicted with the McFadden Act.10' The Commissioner ar-
gued that the McFadden Act is the exclusive source for approving na-
tional bank branches and that the regulation conflicts with this well-
established precedent. 0 5 The Comptroller argued that FIRREA consti-
tutes additional and distinct authority for approving national bank
branches. 0 6 In ruling upon this issue, the court stated that great defer-
ence should be given to the Comptroller of the Currency's interpreta-
tion of the National Bank Act. 07 It therefore determined that FIR-
REA exists as an independent source of federal branching authority
and that the McFadden Act does not curtail the authority given in sub-
section 1823(k). 108
Senior Circuit Judge Heaney dissented, basing his opinion on two
substantive conclusions. 0 9 First, he determined that 12 U.S.C.A. §
1823(k) is not ambiguous and the RTC does not have the authority to
rewrite the statute in order to promulgate regulations not authorized by
the statute itself." 0 Judge Heaney concluded that because the statute is
not ambiguous, the first prong of the Chevron test is not satisfied and,
therefore, the majority misapplied -the test."'
Additionally, Judge Heaney found that the principal source of law
101. 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
102. Id. at 64.
103. 911 F.2d at 173.
104. Id. at 174.
105. Id. at 173-74.
106. Id. at 174. The court weighed heavily the RTC's arguments that not only does subsec-
tion 1823(k) provide additional authority for national bank branching, but that subsection
1823(0(4), which applies to acquisitions by out-of-state entities, is an additional source of branch-
ing authorization. Id.
107. Id. The McFadden Act of 1927 was an amendment to the National Bank Act. 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
108. 911 F.2d at 174.
109. Id. at 175 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 179.
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concerning the branching of nationally chartered banks is the McFad-
den Act and he concluded that, until expressly repealed, this Act may
not be circumvented.' 1 2 The dissent further argued that the initial pur-
pose of the Act was to promote "competitive equality" by enabling na-
tional banks to branch under the same restrictions as their state coun-
terparts.1 1 3 However, the present effect is to restrain national banks
from intruding upon areas that were traditionally regulated by the
states."" Judge Heaney determined that neither the legislative history
of FIRREA nor the statute itself manifests an intent to amend the Mc-
Fadden Act and that amendments by implication are disfavored.1 1 5 He
concluded, "'This is a basic premise of our representative democracy;
legislatures, not courts, amend and repeal statutes.'-'6
Although much of the majority opinion is devoted to the narrow
issue of statutory construction of FIRREA and the RTC's authority to
override state branch banking law, the decision has a much broader
and further reaching significance. One practical result of the court's
decision is to diversify and enlarge the class of potential acquirers of
failed or failing thrifts. " 7 Pursuant to the RTC regulation, bank hold-
ing companies no longer possess the exclusive authority to purchase a
thrift with facilities in multiple counties because now single unit com-
mercial banks may also enter the bidding process.118 This should mean
more competitive bidding and should result in a lower cost to the
American public who may nevertheless be required to fund an esti-
mated five hundred billion dollar savings and loan bailout." 9
112. Id. at 177. See supra note 5.
113. 911 F.2d at 176.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 177.
116. Id. (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 318
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
117. K. SHAW. J. SIVON & M. JOHANNES. FIRREA: IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE,
para. 7.02[7](e) (1991) [hereinafter SHAW].
118. Id. A single unit commercial bank could not bid for thrift offices that were located
outside of the county where the bank's principal office was located. This would have been in
violation of state branch banking law. However, a bank holding company could bid for thrift
offices in any county and then individually charter each office as a unit bank within the bank
holding company. Id.
119. See Murphy & Meyer, FIRREA and the S&L Bailout, 19 COLO. LAW 2021 (1990).
As of August 22, 1989, there were approximately 2930 thrifts holding total deposits of $960
billion with nominal assets reaching $1.34 trillion. In the first half of 1989 these thrifts posted an
aggregate net loss of $7.2 billion. Almost 600 of the thrifts were insolvent when measured by
generally accepted accounting principles. Glancz, Thrift Industry Restructured: An Overview of
FIRREA, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 472 (1989).
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An additional consideration is that although the RTC regulation
in question is only concerned with the preemption of state law barring
intrastate branching, FIRREA may be interpreted as providing a
source of authority for interstate branching.12 If this authority exists,
it is subject to approval by the appropriate federal banking agency.' 2 '
Ostensibly this would appear to be a substantial check on the RTC's
authority. However, if the agency from which the approval is needed,
particularly the Comptroller of the Currency, has voiced opposition to
the branching restrictions, this check upon the scope of RTC authority
becomes nonexistent. This extended authority could supplant interstate
branching laws, namely the McFadden Act. 22 Within the regulation
itself, the RTC noted it has no such intention of overriding restrictions
placed upon interstate branching. 123 Nevertheless, once one takes a step
down the slippery slope, it is increasingly difficult to stop.
Even though a state may have little or no access to direct bank
expansion by out-of-state entities, such acquirers, via the RTC regula-
tion, could still assemble a network of branches within the state by
acquiring a failed or failing thrift.' 2 ' In 1988 the Arkansas Legislature
passed the Regional Reciprocal Banking Act giving the Commissioner
the authority to rule upon an application of a regional bank holding
company that wishes to acquire an Arkansas bank or bank holding
company. 2 5 Allowing an out-of-state acquirer to buy a failed or failing
120. SHAW, supra note 117, at 7-11. Presently the McFadden Act does not provide the
authority for a national banking association to establish branches across state lines. 12 U.S.C. §
36(c) (1988).
121. The statute provides, "[W]here otherwise required by law, transactions under this sub-
section must be approved by the appropriate Federal banking agency of every party thereto." 12
U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(1)(A) (iii) (West 1989). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) is the federal banking agency that authorizes the branching capability of a national bank-
ing association. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988). By a letter which was submitted to the RTC by the
Chief Counsel of the OCC, the Comptroller publicly took a position that the McFadden Act is not
the exclusive source of federal branch authorization. 55 Fed. Reg. 22,323, 22,326 (1990).
122. See supra note 5. There is a possibility that the McFadden Act could be legislatively
repealed. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady has proposed a restructuring plan that would au-
thorize national banking associations to branch across state lines provided there are no intrastate
restrictions. Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1991 at 1, col. 2.
123. The RTC did not absolutely rule out this possibility, but qualified its intention by
stating, -[T]he RTC does not at this time intend to authorize emergency transactions that would
result in interstate branching." 55 Fed. Reg. 22,323, 22, 327 (1990).
124. SHAW, supra note 117, at 7-11.
125. ARK CODE ANN. §§ 23-32-1801 to -1805 (Supp. 1989). The Commissioner is author-
ized to approve applications for acquiring an Arkansas bank or bank holding company. However,
the section is silent as to an out-of-state acquirer buying a thrift and subsequently converting the
thrift into a bank and bank branches.
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thrift and establish an entirely new banking network within the state
would indirectly circumvent the Commissioner's power to regulate in
this area.
The decision may also facilitate a continuing trend in the banking
industry of consolidation and centralization in Arkansas and the nation.
An unstated policy of the RTC is to prefer the sale of an entity in its
entirety and avoid selling a thrift in piecemeal fashion.' 26 Presumably,
then, the most likely acquirers are large banks or bank holding compa-
nies. Based on this presumption, these larger institutions may obtain a
significant advantage because of the broader lending authority resulting
from a network of branches. 2 ' Because of economies of scale, the over-
head and administratiave cost can be spread over a larger asset base.
Given this fact, coupled with the realization that many larger institu-
tions are nationally chartered banks, 12 8 the decision may in effect pro-
mote erosion of the doctrine of competitive equality. 2 9
Finally, even though the preemption of Arkansas branch banking
laws will become moot after December 31, 1998,130 this precedent may
be extended to other Arkansas banking laws. A major barrier to contin-
uing acquisition of failed or failing thrifts by large bank holding com-
panies is a limitation on the percentage of state-wide deposits that a
bank holding company may control.' 3' In Arkansas a bank holding
126. Telephone interview with Jane Jankowski, a spokesperson for the RTC in the Kansas
City office, March I1, 1991.
127. SHAW, supra note 117 at 7-11.
128. As of June 30, 1990, only 80 of Arkansas' 257 commercial banks were nationally
chartered, yet these 80 banks held 50.5% of total aggregate deposits. REPORT OF THE BANK
COMMISSIONER OF ARKANSAS (1990).
129. As of June 30, 1990, six of the state's seven largest commercial banks were nationally
chartered. REPORT OF THE BANK COMMISSIONER OF ARKANSAS (1990). Worthen Banking Corpo-
ration, the state's largest bank holding company, may be at the forefront of the continued expan-
sion of larger institutions. When asked about the state's two largest thrifts, now held by the RTC,
Worthen CEO Curt Bradbury said, "We remain interested in the government's plan with respect
to the recapitalization of Savers Federal and First Federal Savings & Loan in Little Rock .... We
would be as interested in one as the other." Ark. Gazette, June 30, 1989, at CI, col. 2.
130. See supra note 5. Bills were introduced in the Arkansas Legislature in 1991 that would
eliminate the phase-in steps required by ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-1202(b) (Supp. 1989), and
would immediately allow state-wide branching. However, the bills never progressed to the floor of
either house for a vote.
131. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-308(a) (1987). The section provides:
A bank holding company is prohibited from acquiring ownership or control of the stock
or the assets of any bank if, after giving effect to the acquisition of the stock or the
assets of that bank, the acquiring bank holding company would own or control, directly
or indirectly, banks having in the aggregate more than fifteen percent (15%) of the




company may possess no more than fifteen percent of the total bank
deposits in the state. Attempts to repeal this limitation in the Arkansas
Legislature failed in 1991.132 Nevertheless, the RTC may rely upon the
precedent set by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and use its over-
ride power to supplant this limitation as well.
S. Scott Luton
132. A bill was introduced in the Arkansas Legislature in 1991 that would repeal the law
placing a fifteen percent limitation on deposits held by bank holding companies. However, the bill
was voted down after the House Insurance and Banking Committee gave it a pass recommenda-
tion. Ark. Gazette, Feb. 19, 1991, at DI0, col. 5.
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